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RECENT DECISIONS
principal case, based its holding on its prior decisions7 indicating
that such prior decisions permitted the action. Examination of these
decisions fails to disclose that any of the cases have been decided
on such a theory. In one case the action was for negligence of a
physician in the performance of his services.8 In others, the Court
spelled out an express contract and held the defendant liable for a
breach of that contract.9 The decision in the principal case was,
at most, based on dicta in the prior decisions. However, it would
appear that where there is a fiduciary or contractual relationship, in
all justice, a cause of action should be maintainable.' 0 The principal
case presents possibilities for opening up an entire new field of litigation, especially in New York where the complexities of modern
business are at their height. This, however, should not deter a
Court from handing down a decision that is sound in principle and
does substantial justice.
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CRIMINAL PROCEEDING UNDETERTINED.-The

defend-

ant charged the plaintiff in the State of Florida with having committed larceny. Through the action of the defendant the governor
of the State of Florida made requisition upon the governor of the
State of New York for extradition of the plaintiff, who was in
New York. The plaintiff was arrested upon the process of a magistrate issued in New York State, under its procedure and brought
before the governor who determined that the prisoner was not a
fugitive and should not be surrendered. The plaintiff was thereupon discharged, and instituted this action for malicious prosecution alleging that defendant falsely and maliciously and without
probable cause accused him of being a fugitive from justice, as a
result of which he was arrested in New York as a fugitive and
imprisoned. Held, when extradition proceedings are set in motion
by one maliciously and without probable cause to believe that the
subject of the proceeding is a fugitive from justice, and such proceeding terminates upon the ground that the subject was not a
fugitive from justice, an action for malicious prosecution will lie,
though brought prior to the termination of the original criminal
prosecution. Keller v. Butler, 246 N. Y. 249, 158 N. E. 510 (1927).
The Court reached its decision on the theory that extradition
proceedings could not be instituted unless the subject was in Florida
actually, and not constructively, at the time of the larceny so as to
make him a fugitive.' Extradition can lie only where the subject
'Carpenter v. Blake, 75 N. Y. 12 (1878); Bush Terminal Co. v.
Insurance Co., 182 App. Div., aff'd 228 N. Y. 575 (1920); Glanzer v.
Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236 (1922); Jaillet v. Cashman, 235 N. Y. 511
(1923).
'Carpenter v. Blake, supra, note 7.
' Bush Terminal Co. v. Insurance Co., and Glanzer v. Shepard, supra.
note 7.
"See (1900) 14 Harv. L. Rev. 184, for full discussion of advisability
of permitting such an action to lie.
'Hyatt v. Corkran, 188 U. S. 691 (1903); McNichols v. Pease, 207
U. S. 100 (1907).
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is a fugitive.2 The mode in which fugitives are to be arrested,
brought before the governor 3 and surrendered pursuant to requisiBefore surrendering a person, it is
tion is prescribed by statute.
the duty of the governor to determine whether or not he is a
fugitive from the demanding state.- For the wrongful institution
of such proceedings, the authorities hold that an action for malicious
prosecution will lie. 5 Similarly, actions in the nature of malicious6
prosecution have been maintained for the abuse of a search warrant,
of an injunction order 7 of a warrant of attachment.8 It has also
been held in other jurisdictions that the termination of the original
criminal prosecution is not a condition precedent to the maintenance
of the action for the malicious abuse of the process. 9 These holdings, as the Court well demonstrated, are sound in principle, and the
holdings were based more upon a desire to do substantial justice than
upon fine distinctions between actions for malicious prosecution and
actions for the malicious abuse of process.
PARTNERSHIP-FIRM PROPERTY-STOCK ExCHANGE SEAT.-Father
and son, as partners, conducted a banking and brokerage business
from 1899 to 1901. With money given him by his father, the son had
purchased a seat on the New York Stock Exchange. Upon the
father's death in 1901, the son formed a new partnership with a
younger brother. The firm name was continued and the same set
of books was used. Under the new articles, the firm agreed to
pay $3600 per annum "as compensation for and in consideration of
the contribution to the firm of the entire and exclusive benefit of
the membership in the New York Stock Exchange." Through this
membership the firm was enabled to execute orders upon the Exchange. After a number of years of trading, the firm encountered
difficulties in the post-war period and finally made an assignment for
the benefit of creditors. A petition in bankruptcy shortly followed
and, in due course, both the partnership and the individual members
were adjudicated bankrupts. The individual in whose name the Exchange membership stood, had, prior to the failure, misappropriated
substantial sums in securities entrusted to him by a testamentary
trustee and a charitable corporation. It developed that the Stock
Exchange seat constituted the greater part of the assets. The seat

'U. S. Const. Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, as supplemented by the Act of 1793,

1 Stat. L., 302, now embodied in U. S. Rev. Stat. §§ 5278, 5279.
'N. Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 827, 828.
"Hogan v. O'Neill, 255 U. S. 52, 56 (1921); McNichols v. Pease,
supra, note 1,108; N. Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 827.
Johnson v. Corrington, 7 Ohio Dec. 572 (1878); Malone v. Belcher,
216 Mass. 209, 103 N. E. 637 (1913); Cardival v. Smith, 109 Mass.
158 (1872).
'Boeger v. Langenberg, 97 Mo. 390, 11 S. WA. 223 (1889).
'Powell v. Woodbury, 85 Vt. 504, 83 Atl. 541 (1912); Mark v,
Hyatt, 135 N. Y. 306, 31 N. E. 1099 (1892); Rieger & Co. v. Knight,
128 Md. 189, 97 AtI. 358 (1916).
8
Lawrence v. Hagerman, 56 Ill. 68 (1870); Brand v. Hinchman,
68 Mich. 590, 36 N. W. 664 (1888).
'Spangler v. Booze, 103 Va. 276, 49 S. E. 42 (1904); Zinn v. Rice,
154 Mass. 1, 27 N. E, 772 (1891).

